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WASHINGTON STAR  
3 DECEMBER 1978

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# Skulduggery, the satellite and SALT

Early this year a junior clerk in the CIA doing night duty at the operations center in Langley, Va., spotted a manual on a desk, stuck it into his briefcase, and took it home. On March 2, he sold this document to a Russian in Athens for \$3,000. Now listen carefully.

Returning to the United States, the young man wrote to a former colleague in CIA advising him that the Soviet Union had offered money to induce the clerk to transmit secret information. This bizarre communication alerted the agency to one almost certain, and another probable, piece of bad news. The first was that the young clerk had already turned something over to the Russians. Why? Because even the KGB has traditions, and one of them, very well established, is that cash is paid not for prospective, but for past services.

The KGB, in the words of Michael Ledeen in New York Magazine, does not buy "on spec." But if the clerk — William Kampiles is his name — whose letter suggested that it might be useful to the agency if he transmitted "disinformation" to the Russians, i.e. information designed to throw the KGB off the track, took a

step which would clearly lead to an investigation of him as someone who had almost certainly already committed a crime, why did the KGB encourage him to make the offer? In effect to burn him. The supposition is that the CIA would in due course have discovered the identity of the stolen document, and that the clerk who stole it must be thought to have been the man solely responsible. Why? Because there was — is — someone else, higher up in the agency who was critical to the entire operation. The word they use in the spy world is a "mole."

What we did find out was what Kampiles gave to the Russians, simply put, probably the most important piece of technological information stolen from the agency since 1960 — the supersecret KH-11 manual. What the KH-11 does is transmit directly, from a distance as great as 300 miles above the earth, electronic signals that can distinguish between ugly and handsome Russians, even through cloud cover. That information is reproduced on a digital receiving set which composes facsimiles of the photographed information more

accurate even than the photographs themselves on which we have been relying, which are dropped by parachute from our workhorse satellites, intercepted by airplanes, and developed in our laboratories.

It is bad enough that the Soviet Union now knows what are the far reaches of our surveillance technology, but what is worse is that anyone who knows what it is we have, and how we bring it off, can reason effortlessly into how to make it inoperative.

The KH-11, for all its extraordinary sophistication, is, one learns, forlornly vulnerable. All you need to know is just how it works in order to develop something which causes it to become instantly inoperative.

Now the bearing of this development on SALT II is crucial, because SALT II, like its predecessor, depends entirely on the verifiable good faith of the contracting partners. A provision of the SALT Treaty called for no effort by either party to dissimulate, or to get in the way of the other party's instruments of detection. Needless to say, the Soviet Union cheated, as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird revealed in an article for the Reader's Digest early in the year. But they cheated on the ground. They did not attempt to interfere with our satellites. There would not be much point in doing so unless they were prepared to go to war. And they did not have the conclusive technology to knock our satellites down.

But now that they are on to our KH-11, which was the "wild card" in our surveillance system, giving us that incremental protection indispensable to our well-being, the Soviet Union can get on with its killer-satellite program, looking forward to the hypothetical day when it can simultaneously knock down the conventional satellites and blind the KH-11.

So that we have prima facie evidence that there is infiltration in the CIA; and we have a factor in respect of SALT II that raises questions as to the feasibility of any understanding whatever. There are men in America who would trust the Russians even without invulnerable systems of verification. One hopes they are not run-